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This paper undertakes a modern event-study analysis of Operation Twist
and compares its eﬀects to those that should be expected for the recent
quantitative policy announced by the Federal Reserve, dubbed “QE2”. We
ﬁrst show that Operation Twist and QE2 are similar in magnitude. We
identify six signiﬁcant, discrete announcements in the course of Operation
Twist that potentially could have had a major eﬀect on ﬁnancial markets,
and show that four did have statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects. The cumulative
eﬀect of these six announcements on longer-term Treasury yields is highly
statistically signiﬁcant but moderate, amounting to about 15 basis points.
This estimate is consistent both with Modigliani and Sutch’s (1966) time
series analysis and with the lower end of empirical estimates of Treasury
supply eﬀects in the literature.
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1. Introduction
On December 16, 2008, the Federal Reserve System’s Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) lowered the target for the federal funds rate to essentially zero in response to the
most severe U.S. ﬁnancial crisis since the Great Depression. Since U.S. currency carries an
interest rate of zero, it is virtually impossible for the FOMC to target a value for the federal
funds rate that is appreciably below zero. Faced with this zero lower bound, the FOMC in
2008 and 2009 endeavored to ﬁnd alternative ways to stimulate the weak U.S. economy, such
as by purchasing large quantities of mortgage-backed securities and longer-term Treasuries
in an eﬀort to improve the functioning of those markets and reduce long-term interest rates.1
In late 2010, in response to continuing weakness in the economy and the zero lower
bound, the FOMC embarked on a second round of quantitative policies, announcing its
intention to purchase “a further $600 billion of longer-term Treasury securities by the end of
the second quarter of 2011.”2 This program has subsequently become known as “QE2” by
the ﬁnancial community and ﬁnancial press.
The QE2 program has been controversial, with detractors conjecturing that the risks
or costs of the policy are large while the beneﬁts are small. For example, an open letter to
Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke signed by several prominent economists and published
in full-page ads in The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times asserted that the
purchases “risk currency debasement and inﬂation” and could “distort ﬁnancial markets”
while “we do not think they will achieve the Fed’s objective of promoting employment” and
are “neither warranted nor helpful in addressing either U.S. or global economic problems”
(e21 Team, 2010).
The present paper aims to estimate the potential beneﬁts of QE2 by measuring the
eﬀect on long-term interest rates of Operation Twist, a very similar program undertaken by
the Kennedy administration and the Federal Reserve in 1961. Although previous studies
of Operation Twist using low-frequency, quarterly data have generally found no signiﬁcant
1On November 25, 2008, the FOMC announced it would purchase $500 billion of mortgage-backed se-
curities and $100 billion of debt directly issued by the housing-related government-sponsored enterprises
(GSEs). On March 18, 2009, the FOMC announced that it would purchase an additional $750 billion of
mortgage-backed securities, an additional $100 billion of GSE debt, and $300 billion of longer-term Treasury
securities. FOMC statements and minutes are available from the Federal Reserve Board’s public web site.
2FOMC statement, Nov. 3, 2010, available from the Federal Reserve Board’s public web site.2
eﬀect of the program on long-term interest rates—see, e.g., the exhaustive time series anal-
ysis by Modigliani and Sutch (1966, 1967)—the present paper undertakes a more modern
high-frequency event-study approach. The event-study methodology restricts attention to
major announcements in the course of Operation Twist that can be pinpointed to a single
day or two. By focusing on changes in Treasury yields in a narrow window surrounding
each announcement, an event study holds other factors aﬀecting the macroeconomic out-
look constant, and thereby isolates the eﬀects of the announcement itself on the yield curve.
Lower-frequency time series analyses must attempt to control for other factors aﬀecting the
yield curve directly, which is fraught with diﬃculties such as unobserved variables (ﬁnan-
cial market expectations of future interest rates and inﬂation), large residual errors, and
endogeneity, as discussed in Section 3, below.
In contrast to Modigliani and Sutch, we ﬁnd that Operation Twist had a highly statis-
tically signiﬁcant eﬀect on longer-term Treasury yields. However, consistent with Modigliani
and Sutch’s (1966) ﬁnding that any eﬀects of Operation Twist “are most unlikely to exceed
some ten to twenty base points” (p. 196), we estimate that the size of these eﬀects is mod-
erate, with a cumulative eﬀect on long-term Treasury yields of about 15 basis points. This
is also consistent with the lower end of Treasury supply eﬀects estimated elsewhere in the
literature, discussed at length in Section 5, below.
Operation Twist also has several advantages over more recent episodes as a laboratory
for estimating the likely eﬀects of QE2. For example, estimates of the eﬀects of the Fed’s
initial round of quantitative policies in 2008 and 2009—what one might call “QE1”—such as
the studies by Gagnon, Raskin, Remasche, and Sack (2010) and D’Amico and King (2010),
are subject to the concern that the 2008–9 ﬁnancial crisis was a time of severe ﬁnancial market
disruption and low liquidity (see, e.g., G¨ urkaynak and Wright, 2011). The exceptionally low
level of liquidity and poor functioning of ﬁnancial markets during this period may have led
Federal Reserve purchases to have an uncharacteristically large eﬀect on markets. Thus, it
is not clear that the eﬀects of Fed purchases during QE1 are representative of the eﬀects we
might expect in more normal times, such as the present environment in which QE2 is being
conducted.
In addition, foreign government institutions have become increasingly large participants
in the U.S. Treasury market over time, with foreign oﬃcial institutions now collectively3
holding almost $3 trillion of U.S. Treasury securities—about one-third of the market—of
which more than $2.3 trillion is held in longer-term Treasury notes and bonds.3 As discussed
by Warnock and Warnock (2009), foreign oﬃcial purchases of U.S. Treasuries often vary by
a hundred billion dollars or more over the course of a few months, due to largely exogenous
factors such as domestic economic developments and exchange rate interventions. Foreign
oﬃcial purchases necessarily complicate any analysis of Treasury supply eﬀects over the past
25 years, and Warnock and Warnock estimate that these purchases themselves have had a
large eﬀect on Treasury yields. An advantage of the Operation Twist period is that the
extent of foreign government involvement in the U.S. Treasury market was so small that it
can safely be ignored.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides the historical
context for Operation Twist and shows the remarkable similarities between that program
and QE2. Section 3 describes our event-study methodology and the data. Results of our
analysis are presented in Section 4. Section 5 compares these results to other estimates of
Treasury supply eﬀects in the literature. Section 6 concludes.
2. Operation Twist
John F. Kennedy was elected President of the United States in November 1960 and inau-
gurated on January 20, 1961. The U.S. economy had been in recession since April of 1960
and the recession was ongoing (it would ultimately end in February 1961, although the level
of economic activity would remain low for several months into the recovery). The incoming
administration wanted to stimulate the economy with easier monetary as well as ﬁscal pol-
icy, but European interest rates were higher than in the U.S., leading to substantial ﬂows
of dollars and gold to Europe under the Bretton Woods ﬁxed exchange rate system. The
Federal Reserve was very reluctant to lower short-term interest rates for fear of worsening
the U.S. balance of payments and the outﬂows of gold to Europe.
The Kennedy administration’s proposed solution to this dilemmma was to try to lower
longer-term interest rates while keeping shorter-term interest rates unchanged. The idea was
that business investment and housing demand were primarily determined by longer-term
3Data are for October 2010 from the U.S. Treasury’s “Major Foreign Holders of U.S. Treasury Securities”
report, available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic.4
interest rates, while the balance of payments and gold ﬂows were determined by cross-country
arbitrageurs who act on the basis of short-term interest rate diﬀerentials. If longer-term
Treasury yields could be lowered without aﬀecting short-term Treasury yields, the reasoning
went, then investment could be stimulated without worsening the balance of payments and
gold outﬂow.4
Thus, on February 2, 1961, Kennedy announced to Congress a policy in which the
Treasury and Federal Reserve would cooperate to change the relative supplies of long-term
and short-term Treasury securities in the open market. The Federal Reserve would maintain
the current level of the federal funds rate, but would buy longer-term Treasury securities
to try to nudge longer-term interest rates lower. The Treasury would reduce its issuance
of longer-term notes and bonds and instead issue primarily short-term securities.5 At the
time, this policy was referred to by Fed staﬀ as “Operation Nudge,” but in retrospect it has
become known as “Operation Twist,” in homage to the dance craze that swept the nation
at about the same time.6
According to statistics from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Fed ultimately
purchased about $8.8 billion of longer-term bonds as part of Operation Twist.7 Recent
authors have sometimes dismissed this program as being very small (e.g., Gagnon et al.,
2010), but in fact the size of Operation Twist is quite comparable to QE2. This is dem-
onstrated in Table 1, which reports the nominal size of both programs along with nominal
GDP and various measures of U.S. Government debt outstanding. Marketable U.S. Treasury
debt includes nominal and inﬂation-indexed Treasury securities in the hands of the public
and excludes nonmarketable securities issued to the Social Security Administration, state
and local governments, and to households in the form of savings bonds.8 U.S. Agencies in-
clude the Federal Home Loan Banks, Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae),
4See The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 3, 1961, p. 2, and Feb. 9, 1961.
5For additional details and discussion, see The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 3, 1961, p. 2, and Feb. 9, 1961.
6Meulendyke (1998), p. 39.
7Meulendyke (1998). In particular, the Fed increased its holdings of longer-term Treasury securities by
$8.8 billion and reduced its holdings of short-term Treasury bills by $7.4 billion. For several years prior
to Operation Twist, the Federal Reserve had subscribed to a “bills-only” policy and held no longer-term
Treasury securities (The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 21, 1961, p. 3.)
8Data are from the U.S. Treasury’s Oﬃce of Public Debt Management for January 1961 and October
2010. Data on nominal GDP are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis for 1961Q1 and 2010Q3.5
Table 1: Size of Operation Twist in Comparison to QE2
Operation Twist QE2
Size of Federal Reserve program ($B nominal) 8.8 600
U.S. GDP ($B nominal) 528 14,730
U.S. Treasury marketable debt ($B nominal) 189.3 8,543
U.S. Agency debt ($B nominal) 7.4 6,449
U.S. Agency-guaranteed debt ($B nominal) 0.2 1,121
Size of Federal Reserve program:
as % of GDP 1.7% 4.1%
as % of U.S. Treasury debt 4.7% 7.0%
as % of U.S. Treasury-guaranteed debt 4.5% 3.7%
Additional supporting program by U.S. Treasury? Yes No
Notes: Size of Operation Twist is from Meulendyke (1998) and debt statistics are from the U.S.
Treasury and Federal Reserve Flow of Funds. U.S. Treasury marketable debt excludes debt held
by the Social Security Administration. U.S. Agencies include Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, whose
debt was implicitly (and later explicitly) guaranteed by the U.S. Treasury. U.S. Agency-guaranteed
debt consists primarily of mortgage-backed securities. During Operation Twist (but not QE2), the
Treasury deliberately issued securities with shorter maturities than usual, but the size of this shift
is diﬃcult to quantify, other than that it amounted to several billion dollars. See text for details.
Federal Home Loan Bank Corporation (Freddie Mac), and a few smaller entities.9 U.S.
Agency-guaranteed debt consists almost entirely of mortgage-backed securities.
Although the debt of the U.S. agencies is not oﬃcially backed by the “full faith and
credit” of the U.S. government, these agencies had close historical ties to the government and
their securities were widely viewed as having an implicit government guarantee (a view that
was subsequently conﬁrmed in September 2008, when the U.S. government placed Fannie
and Freddie into receivership and explicitly guaranteed their debt obligations).10 As a result,
Agency-issued and Agency-backed securities have been, ex ante and ex post, close substitutes
for U.S. Treasury securities.
As can be seen in Table 1, the Federal Reserve’s purchases of long-term Treasury
securities during Operation Twist were roughly comparable to QE2 along several dimensions.
9The data in the table are from the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds accounts, Tables L.124–125, for
1961Q1 and 2010Q3. Note that, in the ﬁrst quarter of 2010, about $4 trillion of mortgage-backed securities
guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were shifted directly onto the balance sheets of those agencies
in the Flow of Funds. This reclassiﬁcation does not aﬀect the sum of U.S. Agency debt and U.S. Agency-
guaranteed debt, but it has a large eﬀect on the breakdown between these two categories.
10The U.S. Treasury initially announced a capital injection into Fannie and Freddie of up to $100 billion
each. This guarantee was later doubled to $200 billion each and then made unlimited in December 2009.6
First, Operation Twist was about half as large as QE2 relative to GDP—smaller, but similar
enough in magnitude to be informative. Second, if changes in the supply of long-term
Treasuries have any eﬀect on long-term Treasury yields, then the initial quantity of long-
term Treasury securities in the market should be a much more relevant initial condition than
GDP. This observation suggests that the total Treasury market would be a better benchmark
for the size of each program, and by this metric, Operation Twist was closer in size to QE2.
Third, to the extent that U.S. Agency and Agency-guaranteed debt are close substitutes for
Treasury securities, then the relevant market arguably includes all three of these Treasury-
guaranteed classes of securities.11 Relative to this market, Operation Twist was an even
bigger program than QE2.
Finally, a key feature of Operation Twist, emphasized by the Kennedy administration
from the outset, was the joint participation by both the Federal Reserve and Treasury. While
the Fed was purchasing $8.8 billion of longer-term Treasury securities in the open market, the
Treasury was actively supporting this policy by concentrating its issuance of new Treasury
securities at shorter rather than longer maturities, by an amount that totaled at least several
billion dollars.12 By contrast, the QE2 program has had no discernible support from the
Treasury and, in fact, the average duration of U.S. Treasury securities issued and outstanding
both increased in the second half of 2010, directly counter to the Fed’s goals (Hamilton and
Wu, 2011). If one takes into account the Treasury as well as Federal Reserve contribution to
these programs, then Operation Twist appears to have been substantially larger than QE2.
Operation Twist and QE2 are also very similar qualitatively as well as quantitatively. In
both episodes, the Federal Reserve was unable or unwilling to lower its target for the federal
funds rate—in the case of QE2, because of the zero lower bound on short-term rates, while
in the case of Operation Twist, because of the large gold outﬂows. Thus, the goal of both
programs was to lower longer-term Treasury yields without lowering the federal funds rate.
11One could extend this argument to all AAA-rated debt securities, or even to all debt securities, but
at each successive step the similarity of state-contingent payoﬀs to U.S. Treasury securities diminishes. In
Table 1, we end the scope of the market at U.S. Agency and Agency-backed debt, since the substitutability
and set of state-contingent payoﬀs of those securities is the closest to U.S. Treasuries.
12For example, the Feb. 2 Treasury announcement in Table 2 had a total issuance size of $6.9 billion.
However, Treasury’s Mar. 15 announcement revealed that its commitment to Operation Twist was only
partial, rather than full—see the discussion of that announcement in Section 3.2. Thus, it is diﬃcult to come
up with a more precise estimate of the size of Treasury’s participation in the program, other than that it
amounted to several billion dollars.7
The methods used to implement each program are also very similar: for Operation Twist,
the Fed and Treasury essentially sold short-term Treasury bills and purchased longer-term
Treasury notes and bonds. To implement QE2, the Federal Reserve is ﬁnancing purchases of
longer-term Treasuries by issuing bank reserves. Bank reserves are short-term liabilities of
the Federal Reserve rather than the Treasury, but aside from this technical distinction, the
implementation of the two policies, Operation Twist and QE2, is essentially identical.
In summary, then, Operation Twist was remarkably similar to QE2 in many important
respects. One can even make a strong case that Operation Twist was larger than QE2 and
thus its eﬀects could be an upper bound for those of the more recent program.
3. Methods and Data
Given the similarities between Operation Twist and QE2, it seems reasonable to use Opera-
tion Twist to estimate the likely eﬀects of QE2. However, previous studies of Operation Twist
using lower-frequency regression methods, such as the the exhaustive analysis by Modigliani
and Sutch (1966, 1967) using quarterly data, have generally found no statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀects of the program. Here we reexamine the episode using a high-frequency event-study
approach.
3.1 High-Frequency Event Study Analysis
A high-frequency event-study analysis uses changes in ﬁnancial markets in a narrow window
of time around major, discrete announcements to measure the eﬀects of those announce-
ments. Under the hypothesis of rational expectations in ﬁnancial markets, asset prices
should completely incorporate all information from a public announcement shortly after the
announcement is made. In particular, studying the one- or two-day change in Treasury yields
around a major macroeconomic announcement should be suﬃcient to provide an unbiased
estimate of the complete eﬀect of that announcement on the yield curve. Jones, Lamont,
and Lumsdaine (1998) and Fleming and Remolona (1999) provide evidence supporting this
hypothesis, with no evidence of either “momentum” or “backtracking” in yields in the days
following such announcements.13 Intuitively, it also seems reasonable that ﬁnancial markets
13Although the ﬁnance literature has found evidence of over- or underreaction in some cases for small-
capitalization stocks, such eﬀects have not been documented for larger, more liquid markets such as the S&P
500 or the Treasury market. Indeed, Jones et al. (1998) and Fleming and Remolona (1999) provide evidence
to the contrary for the Treasury market.8
would not leave large riskless proﬁtable trading opportunities unexploited for more than a
few hours, let alone one or two days.
There are several reasons to think that a high-frequency event-study analysis would
be more powerful than lower-frequency time series methods for detecting the eﬀects of Op-
eration Twist. First, longer-term Treasury yields are very sensitive to market expectations
about macroeconomic variables such as inﬂation and the expected path of the federal funds
rate. Unfortunately, these expectational variables can change quite dramatically from one
quarter to the next and are unobserved by the econometrician, making them very diﬃcult to
incorporate into a regression framework.14 A high-frequency event-study analysis holds the
macroeconomic outlook essentially constant by considering changes in yields across a one- or
two-day window surrounding the announcement, across which the macroeconomic outlook
changes very little except for the possible eﬀects of the announcement itself.15
Second, the eﬀects of Operation Twist may have been relatively small, on the order
of ten or twenty basis points, which is no bigger than the quarterly standard deviation of
long-term Treasury yields. Modigliani and Sutch’s (1966) quarterly regression model has
a residual standard error of 9.3 basis points, which they characterize as “remarkably low”
(p. 190) relative to the rest of the literature. Given the size of this standard error, it might
be impossible to ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects of Operation Twist even if the regression
model is correctly speciﬁed and the size of those eﬀects is correctly estimated. By contrast,
daily changes in long-term interest rates are about two basis points, so it is relatively easy
to determine whether a major announcement regarding Operation Twist had a statistically
signiﬁcant impact on long-term bond yields that day.
Finally, there is an endogeneity problem with monthly or quarterly interest rate data
that can make obtaining structural or causal estimates of the eﬀects of Operation Twist
diﬃcult, if not impossible. This is similar to the problem of identifying the eﬀects of a
monetary policy shock in a vector autoregression, which requires an identifying assumption
to disentangle the eﬀects of changes in interest rates on the macroeconomy from the eﬀects
14One can try to control for expectations to some extent by using survey data; however, such survey data
do not exist for the Operation Twist period.
15Of course, this requires that no other major macroeconomic data surprises or announcements occur on
the same day as the announcement in which we are interested. For each of our identiﬁed announcements
below, we verify this assumption by reading the bond market commentary for that day.9
of changes in the macroeconomy on interest rates (e.g., Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans,
1999). Modigliani and Sutch (1966, 1967) estimate a reduced-form time series model for
long-term interest rates and then investigate to what extent changes in the relative supply of
longer-term Treasury securities can explain the residuals of that reduced-form model. But
if the Federal Reserve tended to step up its purchases of longer-term Treasuries whenever
long-term interest rates started to rise—a plausible hypothesis—then Modigliani and Sutch’s
reduced-form approach will be biased toward ﬁnding no eﬀect of Fed purchases on longer-
term yields, or even the perverse eﬀect that Fed purchases caused longer-term yields to
increase. A high-frequency event-study analysis avoids this endogeneity problem as long
as each major announcement being considered was not a response to changes in long-term
interest rates on that same day.16
For all of these reasons, then, an event-study approach oﬀers many advantages over—or
at least a worthwhile alternative to—low-frequency time series methods for estimating the
eﬀects of Operation Twist.
3.2 Six Major Announcements
To perform an event-study analysis, we must ﬁrst identify major announcements in the course
of Operation Twist that carried signiﬁcant news about the program and whose release can
be pinpointed to a single day or two. We ﬁrst performed a search in the ProQuest Historical
Newspapers database for all articles in The Wall Street Journal in 1961 and early 1962 that
mentioned the Federal Reserve or Treasury.17 This produced several hundred results. We
quickly read through these articles, and the WSJ’s weekly bond market recaps, to identify
episodes that were related to Operation Twist—that is, the objective of lowering longer-
term interest rates. This narrowed the number of relevant articles down to a few dozen. Of
these, we identiﬁed six that, rather than rehashing the goals and methods of the program,
represented major new announcements in the development of Operation Twist. These six
announcements are summarized in Table 2.
16For more discussion of this point and an application of high-frequency methods to identify the eﬀects of
monetary policy shocks in a VAR, see Faust, Swanson, and Wright (2004).
17Unfortunately, a search for the phrase “Operation Twist” over this period yields no results because the
program did not come to be known by that name until a few years later. Also note that the widely-used








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The ﬁrst of these announcements is President Kennedy’s introduction of the program
on February 2, 1961. According to The Wall Street Journal, the announcement took place
early in the day as part of an “economic message” from the President to Congress, in which
the President outlined the rationale, goals, and methods of Operation Twist and announced
that the Federal Reserve would support the Treasury in its implementation.18 According to
bond market commentary in The Wall Street Journal, the announcement had a signiﬁcant
impact on bond markets and was the main driver of bond yields that day. Because the
announcement occurred early in the day, leaving plenty of time for markets to respond, we
use a one-day event window, from the market close on Feb. 1 to the market close on Feb. 2,
to measure the eﬀects of the announcement on Treasury yields.
A few hours after the President’s message, “after the end of regular trading hours,”
the Treasury declared that its upcoming refunding of $6.9 billion of Treasury debt would
be concentrated entirely at the 18-month maturity, instead of longer maturities.19 The
announcement was obviously intended to bolster the President’s introduction of Operation
Twist earlier in the day, but the size and complete concentration of the refunding at shorter
maturities may have been a surprise to ﬁnancial markets and could have created additional
follow-on eﬀects on bond yields the next day. Because the announcement occurred after the
close of trading on Feb. 2, we use a one-day event window from the market close on Feb. 2
to the market close on Feb. 3 to measure the eﬀect of the refunding announcement.
Several days later, on February 9, the Federal Reserve released its weekly breakdown
of Treasury security holdings by maturity for the week ended Wednesday, February 8. The
report showed the Fed had made a rare addition to its holdings of longer-term Treasury
securities during the week, which was noteworthy because for the previous ten years the Fed
had followed a “bills-only” policy of purchasing only Treasury bills with 12 months or less to
18This economic message should not be confused with T h eE c o n o m i cR e p o r to ft h eP r e s i d e n t ,which was
released by President Eisenhower on January 18, 1961, two days before Kennedy’s inauguration. Kennedy’s
economic message announced and outlined Operation Twist, and the details were subsequently ﬁlled in by
Administration oﬃcials in conversations with reporters. Although the economic message contained other
economic proposals, such as a temporary extension of unemployment beneﬁts, many of these other proposals
had been anticipated by Kennedy’s Jan. 30 State of the Union Address, executive orders, and speeches.
Contemporary accounts in The Wall Street Journal focus almost entirely on Operation Twist, so there
appears to have been little else in the message of comparable interest to ﬁnancial markets. See The Wall
Street Journal, Feb. 3, 1961, p. 2., p. 18, and Feb. 6, 1961. For the text of Kennedy’s economic message,
State of the Union Address, and executive orders, see Woolley and Peters (2010).
19Articles describing this announcement are the same as for the previous announcement. The quote is
from The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 3, 1961, p. 18.12
maturity except in the event of a substantial disruption in longer-term Treasury markets.20
Although the Fed’s purchase was not particularly large and the maturity was not very long
(just over 1 year), it was a clear departure from its bills-only policy and the ﬁrst signal
from the Fed (rather than the Administration) that it was at least tentatively supporting
Operation Twist.21 The timing of the Fed’s statistical release on Feb. 9 is not reported
by either The Wall Street Journal or The New York Times, but other such releases were
typically made late in the day (see, e.g., the April 6 announcement, below). Since the timing
of the release on Feb. 9 is unclear, we use a two-day event window from the market close on
Feb. 8 to the market close on Feb. 10 to measure the impact of this announcement.22
The Federal Reserve dramatically increased its commitment to Operation Twist a few
days later, on February 20, 1961. That afternoon, the Federal Open Market Committee
released what was then an extremely rare public statement, describing a change in its gov-
ernment bond-buying policy. The announcement read, in part:
During recent years, transactions for the system account, except in correction of
disorderly markets, have been made in short-term U.S. Government securities.
Authority for transactions in securities of longer maturity has been granted by the
open market committee of the Federal Reserve System in the light of conditions
that have developed in the domestic economy and in the U.S. balance of payments
with other countries. (The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 21, 1961, p. 3)
The release also explicitly extended the scope of Federal Reserve purchases of Treasury se-
curities to maturities greater than ﬁve years.23 The announcement was striking, both for
the manner of its release and because of its clear endorsement of the goals and methods of
Operation Twist. Any previous doubts about the degree to which the Fed was committed to
the Kennedy Administration program were immediately dispelled with this announcement.
20For more discussion of the Fed’s bills-only policy, see The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 21, 1961, p. 3.
21For example, The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 10, 1961, reported that “The Kennedy Administration has
been seeking the cooperation of the Federal Reserve Board to bring down long-term interest rates,” but
that “The Federal Reserve has not said whether it plans any change in its open-market operations to nudge
long-term rates downward.”
22Given the timing of the Apr. 6 announcement, it is very likely that the Feb. 9 announcement also occurred
after the market close. We use a two-day window here to be on the conservative side, but using a one-day
window would make essentially no diﬀerence in the results (see Table 3, below).
23The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 21, 1961, p. 3 and p. 21. A few days later, on Feb. 23, the Federal Reserve’s
weekly balance sheet report conﬁrmed that it had in fact purchased a signiﬁcant quantity of such securities.
However, these purchases were not a surprise given the Feb. 20 statement (The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 24,
1961), so we do not include Feb. 23 among our announcements in Table 2.13
The Fed’s statement was released at 2:45pm, reportedly “too late for the investment com-
munity at large to become heavily involved in the market.”24 Thus, we use a two-day event
window for this announcement, from the market close on Friday, Feb. 17 to the market close
on Tuesday, Feb. 21.
The four announcements above each signaled an increasing degree of commitment
by the Treasury or the Federal Reserve to Operation Twist. In contrast, on March 15,
1961, a Treasury announcement was perceived by ﬁnancial markets as a decreased degree
of commitment to the program. After the markets closed that afternoon, the Treasury
announced an advance debt refunding operation, in which an oﬀer is made to exchange soon-
to-mature Treasury securities for newly-issued, longer-maturity Treasuries.25 The refunding
itself was not so much a surprise as was the timing of the announcement (during Operation
Twist) and the surprising length of the debt maturities being oﬀered in exchange (ﬁve and six
years). As reported by The New York Times, “Market circles had expected that the advance
refunding device... would be used by the Treasury again, but not so soon, and especially not
while the Federal Reserve System was engaged in a market operation... aimed at reducing
long-term interest rates.”26 A c c o r d i n gt ot h eThe Wall Street Journal, “Some interpreted
the advance refunding as indicating a change of thinking by the Treasury and the Federal
Reserve System,” in particular that it “‘may mean the monetary authorities, including the
Federal Reserve, are satisﬁed with prices and rates prevailing in the bond market [and] may
believe that business in general is on the road to recovery.’”27 The expected eﬀect of this
announcement on long-term interest rates is thus opposite to the eﬀects of the ﬁrst four
24The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 21, 1961, p. 21. In the early 1960s, government securities trading desks
typically closed at 3:30pm. Moreover, daily quotation sheets distributed to clients and newspapers typically
were based on 2:30pm price quotations, so it is unclear whether any eﬀects of the Fed’s 2:45pm announcement
are reﬂected in our market quotations for Feb. 20. See Scott (1965), Chap. 3, for more details.
25The New York Times, Mar. 16, 1961.
26The New York Times, Mar. 17, 1961.
27The Wall Street Journal, Mar. 20, 1961. The market’s interpretation of Treasury’s announcement was
at least partly correct: Treasury staﬀ had decided that new Treasury issuance would continue to focus on
short maturities (consistent with Operation Twist), but that refundings of oustanding Treasury debt would
continue to take place at long maturities (The Wall Street Journal, Mar. 16, 1961). The thinking behind
this policy was that holders of outstanding Treasury debt would roll their debt over, anyway, so that issuing
longer-term securities to these investors would not aﬀect the spread between long- and short-term yields
and thus would not interfere with Operation Twist (ibid.). However, the market reaction to the Treasury
announcement suggests that this policy in fact may have been misguided and counterproductive. Thus, after
the Mar. 15 announcement, one could reasonably characterize the Treasury as being “partially committed”
to Operation Twist rather than fully committed.14
announcements discussed above. Because the announcement was made after the market
close, we use a one-day event window, from the market close on Mar. 15 to the market close
on Mar. 16, to measure the eﬀects of the announcement.
Our sixth and ﬁnal announcement regarding Operation Twist occurred on April 6,
1961, and again corresponds to a weekly statistical release by the Federal Reserve. This
release, covering the Fed’s Treasury holdings for the week through Wednesday, April 5,
showed a substantial increase in the Fed’s holdings of longer-term Treasury securities, and
in particular the ﬁrst purchase by the Fed in many years of Treasury bonds with greater
than ten years to maturity. These purchases provided renewed conﬁrmation of the Fed’s
commitment to Operation Twist, and were reported as such by the press.28 The statistical
release occurred “after the market had closed,” so we use a one-day event window for this
announcement, from the market close on Thursday, Apr. 6, to the market close on Friday,
Apr. 7.29
For each of these six announcements, we then collected data on Treasury market closing
prices from the Government Securities column of The Wall Street Journal for the business
days before, during, and after the announcement.30 (Although daily yield curve data are
available in electronic format from the Federal Reserve Board and other sources, these data
do not begin until 1962.) We focused on collecting data for a wide range of maturities that
accurately characterize the yield curve at both the short and long ends; in particular, we
collected data on Treasury securites with 3 mon t h s ,1y e a r ,2y e a r s ,5y e a r s ,1 0y e a r s ,a n d
30 years remaining to maturity. To reduce the inﬂuence of idiosyncratic changes in price for
any single Treasury security on our results, we computed the average yield to maturity for
the three Treasury securities closest to each target maturity listed above.31
28The Wall Street Journal, Apr. 7, 1961, and Apr. 10, 1961.
29The New York Times, Apr. 7, 1961.
30As discussed above, these reported yields come from quotation sheets distributed by Treasury market
dealers that were typically based on 2:30pm price quotations and thus do not correspond exactly to the
3:30pm closing prices in the market (Scott, 1965). However, they would typically be very close to the closing
prices and we will refer to them as being closing prices for expositional convenience. Also, in a few cases
(Mar. 15–16 and Apr. 7), data from The Wall Street Journal were unavailable or illegible, in which case we
used Treasury yields for the same securities as reported by The New York Times.
31We exclude callable bonds from this analysis (which are quoted with a range of maturity dates spanning
several years), in order to ensure that the maturity of the bond is accurately measured and that the price is
free from any implicit option premia associated with callability. At the ﬁve-year maturity, there were only
two noncallable securities with close to ﬁve years remaining to maturity, so we use two rather than three
securities to measure yields at that maturity.15
3.3 Hypothesis Tests
The null hypothesis for our analysis is that changes in the expected net supply of long-term
Treasury bonds—either through a change in issuance by the Treasury or a change in Federal
Reserve purchases—have no eﬀect on Treasury yields at any maturity. The alternative
hypothesis is that a reduction in the net supply of long-term Treasuries—either through a
decrease in Treasury issuance of long-term bonds or an increase in Federal Reserve purchases
of long-term Treasury securities—should cause long-term Treasury yields to fall.32
Under the alternative hypothesis, the eﬀect of Operation Twist on short-term Treasury
yields is a little less clear. In the ﬁrst two announcements in Table 2, President Kennedy
and the Treasury gave no indication that the total quantity of Treasury issuance would be
changed, only its composition. Thus, while the Treasury’s issuance of long-term bonds would
decrease, its issuance of short-term securities would increase. All else equal, this would tend
to push short-term Treasury yields upward. However, whether this tendency is realized or
not depends crucially upon the actions of the Federal Reserve: if the Fed does not change
its target for the federal funds rate, then the shortest-term Treasury yields will remain
essentially unchanged, since they are tightly tied to the federal funds rate. In other words, if
the Fed maintains a constant target for the federal funds rate after the Treasury’s change in
issuance, then the Fed will end up neutralizing the Treasury’s increased issuance of shorter-
term Treasury securities by exchanging those securities on the open market for reserves, in
order to maintain the funds rate peg. Thus, even under the alternative hypothesis, there
may be no eﬀect of Operation Twist on short-term Treasury yields if the Federal Reserve
does not permit those yields to rise. However, we should not see short-term yields decrease
as a result of Operation Twist, under either the null or alternative hypothesis.
To estimate the eﬀects of Operation Twist, we would ideally like to have data on
ﬁnancial market expectations of the net supply of long-term bonds both before and after
each announcement in Table 2, in order to measure the change in market expectations of
supply attributable to each announcement. Unfortunately, no such data exist.
32This sign prediction follows from a downward-sloping demand curve for long-term Treasuries: as the
available quantity decreases, the equilibrium price should increase and the yield to maturity fall. Greenwood
and Vayanos (2008) and Vayanos and Vila (2009) provide a formal model with preferred-habitat investors
and risk-averse arbitrageurs that implies a downward-sloping demand curve for Treasury securities of each
maturity.16
Nevertheless, we can test the null hypothesis by measuring the change in yields across
each announcement and determining whether and to what extent the change is statistically
signiﬁcant—that is, how large is the change in yields relative to the unconditional standard
deviation of Treasury yields—and whether the change is in the direction predicted by the
alternative hypothesis. If the announcements consistently lead to signiﬁcant eﬀects in the
direction predicted by the alternative, then we would reject the null and turn to the question
of estimation of the total size of the eﬀects of Operation Twist.
Finally, note that ﬁve of the six announcements identiﬁed in Table 2 represented a per-
ceived increase in the commitment of the Treasury and Federal Reserve to Operation Twist.
Each of these ﬁve announcements thus should have caused markets to revise downward their
estimate of the current and future supply of long-term Treasury bonds, and should have led
to a decrease in long-term Treasury yields under the alternative hypothesis. By contrast,
the March 16 announcement was seen as a decrease in the commitment of the Treasury and
Federal Reserve to the program, and thus should have caused markets to revise upward their
estimate of the current and future supply of long-term Treasury bonds, leading to an increase
in long-term Treasury yields.
4. Results
The results of the event study analysis described above are summarized in Table 3. The top
panel reports Treasury yields at the market close the day before, the day of, and the day
after each announcement. The second panel reports the change in Treasury yields across
the event window for each announcement. The bottom panel reports the unconditional
standard deviation of Treasury yield changes over one- and two-day windows as benchmarks
for comparison.33
The statistical signiﬁcance of each Treasury yield response in the table is assessed
relative to the unconditional standard deviation for the same maturity and window size in
the bottom panel. One, two, or three stars next to a number denotes statistical signiﬁcance
33We discuss the 6- and 8-day changes below. Unconditional standard deviations are computed for 1962,
for two reasons: First, daily data on Treasury yields are available from the Federal Reserve Board beginning
on January 2, 1962, but not before. Second, we want to compute an unconditional standard deviation that
is not unduly inﬂuenced by Operation Twist itself, and 1962 largely postdates the Operation Twist period.
The unconditional standard deviation of Treasury yield changes in 1963 and in 1964 are less than in 1962,
so our measure of standard deviation here is conservatively large.17
Table 3: Treasury Yields around Operation Twist Announcements
Date 3-mo. 1-yr. 2-yr. 5-yr. 10-yr. 30-yr.
Treasury Yields around Announcement Dates (percent):
Feb. 1 (Wed.) 2.263 2.787 3.05 3.565 3.783 3.90
Feb. 2 (Thurs.) 2.273 2.78 3.007 3.53 3.747 3.86
Feb. 2 (Thurs.) 2.273 2.78 3.007 3.53 3.747 3.86
Feb. 3 (Fri.) 2.272 2.81 3.043 3.51 3.713 3.845
Feb. 8 (Wed.) 2.327 2.81 3.077 3.51 3.753 3.84
Feb. 9 (Thurs.) 2.327 2.827 3.077 3.51 3.753 3.835
Feb. 10 (Fri.) 2.355 2.85 3.097 3.52 3.743 3.83
Feb. 17 (Fri.) 2.387 2.827 3.037 3.49 3.73 3.795
Feb. 20 (Mon.) 2.422 2.833 3.023 3.47 3.713 3.795
Feb. 21 (Tues.) 2.497 2.887 3.01 3.40 3.65 3.735
Mar. 15 (Thurs.) 2.353 2.805 2.947 3.395 3.69 3.795
Mar. 16 (Fri.) 2.328 2.77 2.937 3.48 3.723 3.81
Apr. 6 (Thurs.) 2.283 2.858 2.993 3.445 3.733 3.82
Apr. 7 (Fri.) 2.282 2.808 2.98 3.435 3.73 3.805
Responses to Announcements (basis points):
1-day change, Feb. 1–2 1 −0.7 −4.3∗ −3.5∗ −3.7∗∗ −4∗∗∗
1-day change, Feb. 2–3 −0.233 .7 −2 −3.3∗ −1.5
2-day change, Feb. 8–10 2.84 2 1−1 −1
2-day change, Feb. 17–21 11∗∗∗ 6∗ −2.7 −9∗∗∗ −8∗∗∗ −6∗∗∗
1-day change, Mar. 15–16 −2.5 −3.5∗ −18 .5∗∗∗ 3.3∗ 1.5
1-day change, Apr. 6–7 −0.2 −5∗∗ −1.3 −1 −0.3 −1.5
Cumulative Response (bp):
ﬁrst four announcements 14.7∗∗∗ 12.3∗∗ −1.3 −13.5∗∗ −16∗∗∗ −12.5∗∗∗
all six announcements 12∗ 3.8 −3.7 −6 −13∗∗∗ −12.5∗∗∗
Unconditional Standard Deviation of Treasury Yield Changes (bp):
1-day changes 2.14 1.99 2.25 1.93 1.73 1.15
2-day changes 3.18 3.08 3.50 2.95 2.58 1.67
6-day changes 4.87 5.77 6.45 5.56 4.00 2.90
8-day changes 6.81 7.37 8.83 6.89 4.80 3.47
Notes: Treasury yields are averages for the three non-callable Treasury securities with remaining
maturity closest to that listed. The choice of a 1- or 2-day event window is based on the timing of each
announcement reported in Table 2.
∗,
∗∗,a n d
∗∗∗ denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively; signiﬁcance for 1- and 2-day changes is relative to the unconditional standard
deviations of 1- and 2-day changes in the bottom panel; signiﬁcance for the cumulative changes is
relative to the 6- and 8-day changes. The cumulative change for the ﬁrst four announcements captures
the initial eﬀects of Operation Twist, since the ﬁfth announcement was seen by markets as a policy
reversal (see Table 2). Unconditional standard deviations are for 1962, due to data availability and
to exclude the Operation Twist period. See text for details.18
for a two-sided t-test, even though the alternative hypothesis provides us with clear sign
predictions for the shortest and longest maturities; we do this to minimize confusion (since
the one-sided tests go in opposite directions for short and long maturities, and have no clear
sign prediction at the intermediate 2-year maturity), and also to avoid the appearance of
overstating the signiﬁcance of the results in the table. However, we also discuss in the text
statistical signiﬁcance relative to a one-sided t-test when those results are interesting.
Of the six announcements in Table 3, the most remarkable is the Federal Reserve’s
endorsement of Operation Twist on February 20. Treasury yields with ﬁve or more years to
maturity fell by 6 to 9 basis points (bp), with t-statistics in excess of 3. But what makes these
movements even more striking is the response of 3-month and 1-year Treasury yields, which
simultaneously rose by 11 and 6bp, with the former statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent
level and the latter signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level for a one-sided test in the direction of
the alternative. The Wald statistic for the joint movement of all six Treasury yields during
this two-day window is 53.5, corresponding to a p-value of less than 10−9.M o r e o v e r , t h e
yield curve response is completely consistent with the alternative hypothesis and thus raises
serious questions about the validity of the null.
President Kennedy’s introduction of Operation Twist on February 2 is almost as in-
teresting. Longer-term yields fell by about 4bp that day, while short-term yields were about
unchanged. The response of the 30-year yield is highly statistically signiﬁcant, the 10-year
yield response is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level, and the responses of the 2- and 5-year
yields are signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level for a one-sided test in the direction of the alterna-
tive. The Wald statistic for the joint change in yields is 16.6, with a p-value of 1.1 percent.
Moreover, the yield curve response to this announcement is in the direction predicted by the
alternative.
The response to the Treasury’s announcement after the market close on Feburary 2
is not as strong as for the Fed’s and President’s announcements, above; nevertheless, the
changes in the 10-, 30-, and 1-year Treasury yields are all statistically signiﬁcant at the
10 percent level or better for one-sided tests in the directions predicted by the alternative
(downward for the 10- and 30-year yields, and upward for the 1-year yield). The Wald
statistic for the joint change in yields is 28.6, even larger than for Kennedy’s announcement,
because of the stronger upward “twist” at the 1- and 2-year maturities, a more unusual19
pattern. The p-value for this move is less than 10−4, and it is again in the direction predicted
by the alternative.
The Treasury’s surprise refunding announcement on March 15 is the one announce-
ment in our sample that was perceived as a decrease in the government’s commmitment
to Operation Twist. Thus, the alternative hypothesis predicts that long-term interest rates
should increase in response to that announcement. In fact, this is what we see in the data,
particularly at the 5-year maturity, which is precisely the maturity at which the Treasury
announced that the new supply would be forthcoming. Yields rose by 8.5bp at the 5-year
maturity with a t-statistic of more than 4, but the increases at the 10- and 30-year maturities
are also statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively, for a one-sided
test in the direction of the alternative. At the same time, short-term yields twisted down-
ward by 2.5 to 3.5bp, with the 1-year yield response signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level for a
one-sided test. The Wald statistic for the joint movement of yields is 73.5, with a p-value of
less than 10−13, and this movement is in the direction predicted by the alternative.
Finally, the Federal Reserve’s statistical releases on February 9 and April 6 seem to
have had little eﬀect on the bond market. Although there is a statistically signiﬁcant drop
in the 1-year yield around the April 6 announcement, that response is not in the direction
predicted by the alternative, so it would not be signiﬁcant for a one-sided test. The Wald
statistic for the Feb. 9 announcement is 5.0, with a p-value of 55 percent, while the Wald
statistic for April 6 is 10.9, with a p-value of 9.2 percent.
Beyond the size and statistical signiﬁcance of individual announcements, we investigate
the size and signiﬁcance of Operation Twist as a whole in two ways. First, we look at the
cumulative eﬀect of the ﬁrst four announcements in our sample, each of which represented an
increase in Treasury or Federal Reserve commitment to Operation Twist. Taken together,
these ﬁrst four announcements provide a reasonable estimate of the initial eﬀects of Operation
Twist on the yield curve: Not only is each of these announcements in the same direction, but
they all occur within a period of three weeks during which essentially no other news regarding
Operation Twist was released. As a result, we can have a high degree of conﬁdence that
these ﬁrst four announcements capture essentially all of the information regarding Operation
Twist that was released within the ﬁrst three weeks of the program. One can interpret this
cumulative eﬀect as the initial eﬀect of Operation Twist or what the total eﬀect could have20
been with no future policy reversals or mixed signals.
The second way we investigate the overall eﬀect of Operation Twist is by looking at
the cumulative eﬀect of all six of the announcements in our sample. Here, the interpretation
is less clear-cut: For example, the ﬁfth announcement, on March 15, reversed some of the
initial eﬀects of the program. There is also more time between the fourth, ﬁfth, and sixth
announcements and after the sixth announcement for more incremental information about
Operation Twist to come to light, such as the weekly breakdown of Treasury holdings released
by the Federal Reserve, the periodic issuance and refunding announcements by the Treasury,
and the actual purchases and issuance of Treasury securities made by the Federal Reserve
and Treasury. Nevertheless, summing up the eﬀects of the six announcements in our sample
gives an estimate of the total eﬀects of Operation Twist, inclusive of the eﬀects of policy
reversals.
These cumulative changes are reported in the third panel of Table 3. The statistical
signiﬁcance of the cumulative changes is assessed by comparing them to the unconditional
standard deviations of yields over a correspondingly-sized 6- or 8-day window, reported in
the bottom panel. As can be seen in the table, the cumulative change in yields after the ﬁrst
four announcements is highly statistically signiﬁcant and in the direction predicted by the
alternative. The Wald statistic for the joint yield curve response is 81.8, with a p-value of
less than 10−14. The cumulative eﬀect, however, is moderate, amounting to no more than
about 15bp even at the longest and shortest maturities.
The cumulative eﬀect of all six announcements is somewhat smaller, and is only statis-
tically signiﬁcant at the longest and shortest maturities (10 years, 30 years, and 3 months),
although the t-statistics for the long maturities remain close to 3, and the 3-month response
is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level in the direction of the alternative. The Wald statistic for
the joint response is 35.2, with a p-value of less than 10−5. Again, the total eﬀect on the
longest and shortest maturities appears to have been about 12 to 13bp.
Thus, even though we have found that Operation Twist had a cumulative eﬀect on the
yield curve that is highly statistically signiﬁcant, one could argue that, at 15 basis points,
the eﬀect is not very important economically. Indeed, Modigliani and Sutch argued:
Any eﬀects, direct or indirect, of Operation Twist in narrowing the spread which
further study might establish, are most unlikely to exceed some ten to twenty21
base points—a reduction that can be considered moderate at best.
(Modigliani and Sutch, 1966, p. 196)
However, it should be noted that a 15bp decline in the 10-year Treasury yield would be a
typical response to a 100bp surprise cut in the federal funds rate target (G¨ urkaynak, Sack,
and Swanson, 2005). Such a change in the federal funds rate would usually be regarded as
a non-negligible easing of ﬁnancial market conditions.
Whether a reduction of 15bp in long-term interest rates is economically signiﬁcant
or not may ultimately lie in the eye of the beholder. Nevertheless, it is reassuring that the
eﬀects in Table 3 are consistent with Modigliani and Sutch’s ﬁndings. As discused above, the
standard error of those authors’ quarterly regression speciﬁcation is over 9 basis points, too
large for the eﬀects in Table 3 to show up with any statistical signiﬁcance in their analysis.
5. Comparison to Other Studies
While consistency of our results with Modigliani and Sutch’s (1966, 1967) extensive analysis
is reassuring, there have also been more recent studies of supply eﬀects in the U.S. Treasury
market. Here we relate the size of the eﬀects estimated above to some of the more recent
estimates of supply eﬀects in the literature. For the purposes of comparability across studies,
we normalize each estimate in terms of its predicted eﬀect for QE2; that is, we report
what eﬀect each study would estimate a $600 billion reduction in the supply of longer-term
Treasury securities would have on longer-term Treasury yields. As discussed in Section 2,
we regard Operation Twist and QE2 as being roughly similar in size, so that the predicted
eﬀect of the present paper for QE2 would be about 15bp.
Gagnon, Raskin, Remasche, and Sack (2010) study the Federal Reserve’s purchases
of longer-term Treasury and mortgage-backed securities between 2008 and mid-2009—what
one might call “QE1”. They estimate the eﬀects of QE1 using both high-frequency event
study methods and a lower-frequency, monthly time series analysis. Gagnon et al. estimate
that QE1 had an eﬀect on the 10-year Treasury yield of about 91bp, using their event
study methodology, or 52bp according to their monthly time series regressions. Since the
$1.7 trillion QE1 program was roughly three times the size of QE2, this would imply an
eﬀect of QE2 on the 10-year Treasury yield of about 14 to 30bp. Our estimates in this22
paper are consistent with the very bottom of this range. To the extent that this represents
a discrepancy, it may be due to the fact that QE1 took place during a period of severe
disruption and very low liquidity in ﬁnancial markets (see, e.g., G¨ urkaynak and Wright,
2011), an environment in which those markets may have been more segmented and supply
eﬀects may have been correspondingly more potent.
D’Amico and King (2010) estimate the eﬀects of Federal Reserve purchases of Treasury
securities during QE1 using a panel data set containing the quantity, maturity, date of
purchase, and CUSIP of each Treasury security purchased by the Fed through the program.
They use diﬀerences in the cross-section of Treasury bond prices to estimate the eﬀect of
the Fed’s Treasury purchases on Treasury yields. They estimate that, overall, the eﬀect of
the $300 billion Treasury component of QE1 on the 10-year Treasury yield was about 50bp.
Scaling this up to the size of QE2, this would imply an eﬀect on the 10-year Treasury yield of
about 100bp, far larger than the eﬀect we estimate in the present paper. As with Gagnon et
al. (2010), one reason for D’Amico and King’s (2010) larger estimates may be that markets
were unusually segmented during the period in which QE1 took place, making it easier for
the Fed to move yields in any given market segment. Nevertheless, their estimates do not
seem consistent with the Fed’s experience during Operation Twist.
Hamilton and Wu (2011) relate Treasury supply eﬀects to an aﬃne term structure
model using a preferred-habitat framework developed by Vayanos and Vila (2009). Hamilton
and Wu estimate that $400 billion of Treasury bond purchases by the Fed, focused on the
longest maturities, would decrease long-term Treasury yields by about 17bp. Scaling this up
to the size of QE2, this would imply an eﬀect of about 26bp as a result of those programs.
This is moderately higher than the eﬀect estimated in the present paper, but this discrepancy
may be accounted for by the fact that, in Operation Twist and QE2, the Fed purchased
securities primarily at intermediate rather than the longest maturities, so that the eﬀect on
longer-term yields may be less than in Hamilton and Wu’s idealized thought experiment.
Recognizing this, Hamilton and Wu extend their analysis to the case where $400 billion of
Fed purchases take place at intermediate, 21/2- to 10-year maturities, rather than the longest
maturities; in this case, they estimate an eﬀect on the 10-year Treasury yield of about 11bp.
Scaled up to the size of QE2 and Operation Twist, this would imply an eﬀect of about 17bp,
consistent with the present paper.23
Greenwood and Vayanos (2008) regress the monthly Treasury yield spread—the dif-
ference between long-term and short-term Treasury yields—on measures of the long-term
(10 years or more to maturity) share of Treasury debt outstanding. They estimate that a
1% increase in the long-term share of Treasury debt increases the 20-year Treasury yield
by 7.7bp. Scaling this up to the size of QE2, this would seem to imply an eﬀect of those
programs of about 39 to 54bp. However, most of the Federal Reserve’s purchases of Treasury
securities during Operation Twist and QE2 were concentrated at intermediate maturities of
less than 10 years, and only a small fraction (about one-fourth) took place at the longest
maturities of 10 years or more. As a result, Greenwood and Vayanos’ estimates would imply
an eﬀect of those programs of roughly 10 to 16bp, consistent with the present paper.
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2007) (KVJ) measure the eﬀect of Treasury
supply on the spread between Treasury yields and AAA-rated corporate bond yields. The
idea is that AAA-rated corporate bonds are close substitutes for U.S. Treasuries and thus
the Treasury-corporate spread can help to isolate the idiosyncratic eﬀect of Treasury supply
on Treasury yields. KVJ estimate that an increase in the total quantity of Treasuries out-
standing equal to 1% of U.S. GDP raises Treasury yields overall by about 1.5 to 4bp. While
this estimate is of the same order of magnitude as in the present paper, the two estimates are
nevertheless not directly comparable, because KVJ’s analysis focuses on the total quantity
of Treasury debt outstanding, while Operation Twist and QE2 involved no change in total
Treasury debt, only a change in the relative supply of shorter vs. longer maturity Treasury
securities.
Warnock and Warnock (2009) estimate a quantity eﬀect on Treasury yields using
monthly data on foreign oﬃcial purchases of U.S. Treasury securities. The idea is that pur-
chases of U.S. Treasury securities by the Bank of China or Bank of Japan are made primarily
for exogenous reasons relating to the domestic economy or exchange rate interventions, and
thus represent exogenous changes in the net supply of U.S. Treasuries to the private sector.
Warnock and Warnock estimate that a decrease in the supply of Treasury securities of about
1% of U.S. GDP reduces the 10-year Treasury yield by about 19bp. Scaling this up to the
size of QE2 and Operation Twist would imply a reduction in longer-term Treasury yields
of roughly 38 to 76bp, substantially larger than the eﬀect estimated by Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2007). As with the KVJ analysis, though, Warnock and Warnock’s es-24
timates are not directly comparable to those of the present paper, since Operation Twist
and QE2 did not change the total quantity of Treasury debt outstanding, only the relative
suppply of shorter vs. longer maturity Treasury securities.
Returning to the present paper, it is reassuring that several of the studies above,
using completely diﬀerent methods, arrive at estimates of the eﬀects of QE2 that are in line
with those of the present paper. A potential concern with the event-study methodology in
general is that it restricts attention to only those news-worthy announcements that can be
pinpointed to an exact date. If much of the news regarding Operation Twist was released
incrementally, in between and after the six major announcements in Table 2, then it is
possible that the cumulative eﬀect of the six discrete announcements would miss much of
the true cumulative eﬀect of Operation Twist as a whole. The studies by Hamilton and Wu
(2011) and Greenwood and Vayanos (2008) do not suﬀer from this criticism, and so their
ﬁndings provide some evidence that our six major announcements may indeed have captured
a large majority of the information and eﬀects of the Operation Twist program.
6. Conclusions
For more than forty years, the conventional wisdom regarding Operation Twist has been
driven by the results of low-frequency time series studies, particularly Modigliani and Sutch
(1966, 1967). However, there are inherent problems with these lower-frequency methods, such
as unobserved expectations variables, large standard errors, and particularly endogeneity,
which would occur if the Federal Reserve increased its purchases of longer-term Treasury
securities in response to upward pressure on longer-term interest rates.
The present paper has reexamined Operation Twist using a modern high-frequency
event-study approach, which avoids the problems with lower-frequency methods discussed
above. In contrast to Modigliani and Sutch, we ﬁnd that Operation Twist had a highly
statistically signiﬁcant impact on longer-term Treasury yields. However, consistent with
those authors, we ﬁnd that the size of the eﬀect was moderate, amounting to about 15 basis
points. This estimate is also consistent with the lower end of the range of estimates of
Treasury supply eﬀects in the literature.
Because Operation Twist and QE2 are similar in many important respects, it seems
reasonable to expect the eﬀects of QE2 on longer-term Treasury yields also to be about 1525
basis points. Although this may seem like a small eﬀect in some respects, it nevertheless
may be regarded as important by policymakers. In particular, 15bp is the typical response
of the 10-year Treasury yield to a 100bp surprise cut in the federal funds rate (G¨ urkaynak,
Sack, and Swanson, 2005), and such a shift in the stance of monetary policy would normally
be viewed as substantial. In this respect, then, one could argue that the eﬀects of Operation
Twist (and QE2) were economically as well as statistically signiﬁcant.
Finally, the beneﬁts of these programs in terms of lower interest rates must be weighed
against their costs to assess their overall desirability. Although we have not attempted to
estimate the costs of Operation Twist or QE2 here, those costs are as important as the
beneﬁts for policy analysis, and thus future work on the nature and size of such costs would
be welcome.26
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